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18.1 INTRODUCTION 
The western part of the New Guinea islands is a unique part of Indo­
nesia. Situated furthest from the nation’s capital, Jakarta, it is Indonesia’s 
most sparsely populated and geographically challenging region, and 
has some of the country’s lowest socio­economic indicators. The com­
bination of these difficult geographical and demographic conditions has 
meant that development in the region has always been challenging (Gar­
naut and Manning 1972, 1973; Manning and Rumbiak 1989). 
Papua formally became part of Indonesia through a long and bitter 
process that took place between 1963 and 1969. At the time of annexation 
in 1969, the region was renamed West Irian (Irian Barat) and became a 
province of Indonesia, with Jayapura as its capital. In 1973, the name was 
again changed, to Irian Jaya. This controversial history led to the forma­
tion of movements among the local elites calling for Papua to become 
an independent state. Though relatively low level, sporadic and only 
intermittently violent, these independence movements have consistently 
challenged the legitimacy of Indonesian rule ever since (McGibbon 2006). 
Over the ensuing decades, the Indonesian government attempted to 
weaken Papuan independence movements and accelerate development 
by allocating a higher level of funding per capita to Irian Jaya than to 
the other Indonesian provinces. Critics argued, however, that it was far 
less than the revenue generated by the region’s natural resources. In par­
ticular, much of the revenue from the hugely profitable Freeport mine 
in Mimika district went straight to the central government, fuelling ten­
sions between Jayapura and Jakarta (Resosudarmo et al. 2009a, 2009b).
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The most critical time in the relationship between Jakarta and 
Jayapura was the period 1998–2001. The resignation of President Soe­
harto in mid­1998 and East Timor’s successful demand for a referen­
dum on independence intensified separatist hopes in Irian Jaya. When 
Abdurrahman Wahid became president at the end of 1999, he introduced 
a more accommodative and culturally sensitive approach to the ques­
tion of ethnic conflict and separatist demands by changing the name 
of the province to Papua – the name by which parts of the main island 
were known before contact with the West (Sumule 2003; McGibbon 2004, 
2006). To maintain good relations with the provincial elites, the president 
also endorsed the development of a draft bill on special autonomy for 
Papua. After a long series of debates, in late 2001 the national parliament 
finally enacted Law 21/2001 on Special Autonomy for Papua (Resosu­
darmo et al. 2009a; Widjojo 2010).
The special autonomy legislation gave the provincial government 
authority over decision making in all sectors except international affairs, 
defence, monetary and fiscal policy, religion and justice, as well as a far 
higher share of the revenue originating in Papua than applied to other 
provinces. It specified that the province would receive 80 per cent of the 
revenues from its forestry, fishery and mining sectors, and 70 per cent of 
the revenues from its oil and gas sector until 2026, and 50 per cent there­
after. In addition to the financial transfers from the central government 
that all provinces receive, until 2021 Papua will receive additional special 
autonomy funds (dana otsus) amounting to 2 per cent of the total national 
General Purpose Fund (Dana Alokasi Umum, DAU).
The Indonesian government was slow to implement Law 21/2001. In 
2003, before the transition to special autonomy was complete, the central 
government split Papua into two provinces: Papua with Jayapura as its 
capital, and West Papua (initially called West Irian Jaya) with Manokwari 
as its capital.1
Despite the efforts of the central government to calm separatist ten­
sions by providing special autonomy and increased funding, there is a 
widespread perception that development in Papua is a failed process. 
Critics argue that the benefits of development have been concentrated in 
resource­rich enclaves and urban areas, bypassing most indigenous Pap­
uans (Widjojo 2010). This chapter investigates Papua’s macro­economic 
and micro­economic performance to establish whether such a perception 
is warranted. It attempts to understand the factors behind some of the 
development failures in Papua over the past 10 years, while also drawing 
attention to the successes. 
1 In the rest of the chapter, we refer to the entire region as ‘Papua’, and to the 
two provinces separately as ‘Papua province’ and ‘West Papua province’.
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We first review the general development performance of Papua over 
the past two decades, as represented by trends in economic growth and 
poverty reduction (section 18.2). In section 18.3, we look more closely 
at the drivers of growth in each province, especially mining (in the case 
of Papua province) and liquefied natural gas (LNG) (in the case of West 
Papua province). Section 18.4 focuses on social and demographic indi­
cators in the two provinces, including poverty, equality, health, rural 
and urban population growth, and migration. We then discuss inter­
provincial trends, particularly local government income and expenditure 
(section 18.5), before providing a few concluding remarks.
18.2 GENERAL DEVELOPMENT PERFORMANCE
The two measures adopted in this chapter to assess the general develop­
ment performance of Papua province and West Papua province since the 
implementation of special autonomy are the growth of the economy and 
the progress with poverty alleviation. It is often asserted that the record 
of the two provinces in these respects has been inferior to that of the rest 
of the country, so we use the national situation as our benchmark for per­
formance. If Papua province and West Papua province have performed 
at a similar level to the national average over the past decade or so, it 
could be argued that they have been doing rather well, in spite of the 
frequent assertions to the contrary (Widjojo 2010).
Figure 18.1 shows GDP, including and excluding mining, oil and gas, 
for Papua and for the whole of Indonesia over the two decades from 1993 
to 2012, indexed at 100 in 1993. It shows that the region’s growth rates 
have at least matched those of the national economy. Papua’s total GDP 
increased somewhat faster than the national rate before the enactment 
of the special autonomy law, and at a similar rate thereafter. Excluding 
mining, oil and gas, there was a sharp decline in GDP in Papua during 
the early phase of implementation of the special autonomy law, followed 
by a recovery from the time of the division into two provinces in 2003.
GDP per capita in Papua grew by approximately 1.9 per cent per 
annum on average during the period 1993–2012. This was lower than the 
national rate of 2.9 per cent per annum. Nevertheless, in 2012 the aver­
age level of GDP per capita in Papua and in Indonesia as a whole was 
approximately the same, at Rp 31 million for Papua and Rp 32 million 
for Indonesia. 
Economic growth has been relatively effective in reducing poverty in 
Papua. Figure 18.2 indicates that the proportion of the population living 
below the poverty line, as defined by the central statistics agency, Badan 
Pusat Statistik (BPS), declined in both provinces from about 55 per cent 
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in 1999 to about 30 per cent in 2012. This was still much higher than the 
national average, of around 12 per cent in 2012, even though poverty has 
been declining faster than the national average in the two provinces for 
several years. One could argue that the continuing high levels of pov­
erty in Papua are mainly due to ‘initial conditions’, that is, to the high 
proportion of poor people at the start of the special autonomy era (see 
Ilmma and Wai­Poi, Chapter 5, and Sumarto, Vothknecht and Wijaya, 
Chapter 12).
Given that the economy has been growing, and poverty declining, 
at rates at least comparable to the national level since the implementa­
tion of special autonomy, it could hardly be argued that development in 
Papua has been stagnant or has failed. On the contrary, it seems to have 
been progressing at a relatively good rate. However, we need to look 
Figure 18.1 GDP including and excluding mining, oil and gas, Papua 
and Indonesia, 1993–2012
a	 The	figures	for	1993–2002	are	for	the	former	province	of	Papua;	those	for	2003–12	are	the	
combined	totals	for	Papua	province	and	West	Papua	province.
Source: Provincial	GDP	data	from	BPS.
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more closely at the situation in each province before we can make this 
assertion with any confidence.
18.3 ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
Economic growth and structural change
Although the legislation splitting Papua into two provinces was passed in 
1999 (Law 45/1999), the process was completed only in 2003, when Abra­
ham Atururi was elected the first governor of the province. Table 18.1 
shows economic growth in the original province before it was split into 
two (1993–2001) and in each province since then (2003–12). On average, 
West Papua province has recorded yearly growth in GDP of 12.9 per cent 
since 2003, whereas Papua province has experienced almost no growth. 
The contrast between the two provinces is starker still when one exam­
ines the per capita figures: in 2003–12, GDP per capita grew at an average 
rate of 9.3 per cent per year in West Papua province, but declined by 5.2 
per cent per year in Papua province. Clearly economic development in 
the region as a whole has been dominated by West Papua province.
Figure 18.2 Share of population below poverty line, Papua province, 
West Papua province and Indonesia, 1999–2012
Source: BPS	(various	years).
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The high economic growth rates in West Papua province are mainly 
due to the stellar performance of the LNG sector, which grew at an aver­
age annual rate of 31 per cent as production from PT BP Indonesia’s Tang­
guh LNG project expanded. Most of this gas has been exported, making 
exports the main driver of growth on the expenditure side of GDP (Table 
18.1). Government consumption is another important source of growth. 
As a new province and the recipient of generous special autonomy fund­
ing, West Papua province has been able to increase government expen­
ditures quite rapidly. Together, the growth of Tangguh LNG and the 
expansion of government spending have induced growth in other sec­
Table 18.1 Components of GDP growth, Papua province and West 
Papua province, 1993–2012 (% p.a.)
Category/sector Papua	province West	Papua	
province
2003–121993–2001 2003–12
By expenditure category
Private	consumption 8.7 9.4 7.7
Government	consumption 11.6 14.5 11.6
Fixed	capital	formation 9.1 12.7 6.1
Change	in	stocks 13.0 35.7 18.8
Exports	 12.8 –9.7 15.2
Imports	 12.1 5.9 7.5
By sector
Agriculture 5.4 3.5 3.8
Mining	&	quarrying	 12.1 -8.8 2.0
Manufacturing 5.8 4.0 30.8
Electricity,	gas	&	water	supply	 2.0 6.4 9.0
Construction –1.7 15.0 12.0
Trade,	hotels	and	restaurants 6.4 9.8 8.6
Transport	&	communications 7.2 13.2 11.8
Finance	&	business –2.0 19.0 14.5
Services	 42.1 10.6 13.1
Total
GDP 9.5 0.2 12.9
GDP	per	capita 6.8 –5.2 9.3
Source: Provincial	GDP	data	from	BPS.
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tors, such as finance, services, construction, transport and communica­
tions, and utilities.
Although Papua province has experienced almost no growth in GDP, 
the situation is not as serious as one might think. It is true that the min­
ing sector, dominated by PT Freeport Indonesia, has been declining over 
the last decade or so, leading to a fall in the value of exports. On the 
other hand, government spending and fixed capital investment have 
both grown, by well over 10 per cent per year, contributing to growth 
in sectors such as finance, construction, transport and communications, 
and trade, hotels and restaurants. With so many sectors still experienc­
ing respectable levels of growth, the impact of the stagnant economy on 
the welfare of the population will probably be limited. It should also be 
remembered that mining is typically an enclave activity; its impact on 
the general public is fairly limited, regardless of whether it is booming or 
contracting (Weisskoff and Wolf 1977). 
Papua has depended heavily on natural resources, especially the 
mining, oil and gas sectors, since the mid­1970s (Manning and Rumbiak 
1989; Resosudarmo et al. 2009a). Although this is still the case, there have 
been some structural changes in the two provincial economies since the 
split in 2003 (Table 18.2). The contribution of mining to the economy of 
Papua province declined from 62 per cent in 2003 to 47 per cent in 2012. 
The shares of agriculture and manufacturing also fell, but that of utilities 
remained the same. A few other sectors, notably construction and ser­
vices, increased their shares during the period. Despite these structural 
changes, the economy of Papua province continues to be dominated 
by the mining sector, and in particular by a single company, Freeport 
Indonesia.
The structure of the West Papuan economy has also changed since the 
province was established in 2003. The manufacturing sector, dominated 
by the processing of natural gas from the Tangguh LNG project, sharply 
increased its share from 16 per cent in 2003 to 54 per cent in 2012, thereby 
reducing the relative contributions of all other sectors. One could there­
fore argue that the economy of West Papua province is also dominated 
by a single company, BP Indonesia, replacing the previous dependence 
on agriculture and on mining activities in the Salawati Basin.
On the expenditure side, private consumption and international trade 
have been the most prominent sectors in both provinces (Table 18.2). 
Import and export performance is determined mainly by the activities of 
Freeport Indonesia in Papua province, and those of BP Indonesia in West 
Papua province. In the former province, the growth in both private and 
government consumption suggests that higher public and private expen­
ditures have compensated for some of the decline in Freeport Indonesia’s 
exports.
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Observing the dynamics of economic growth and structural change in 
the two provinces, one can conclude that each is heavily reliant on a sin­
gle industry – indeed, a single company – extracting natural resources. 
When the exports of either of those companies decline, due to a fall in 
world prices or to a reduction in output, inevitably the economy of the 
province concerned will contract or stagnate. To reduce the high depend­
ency in both provinces on extractive industries, policies should be devel­
oped to encourage the development of other sectors. One option would 
be to expand the agricultural and agricultural processing sectors, because 
the contribution of agriculture to both provincial economies is second 
only to mining, and because these sectors could potentially absorb large 
numbers of workers. However, this does not mean that the development 
of other sectors, such as construction, and trade, hotels and restaurants, 
is not important.
Table 18.2 Structure of the economy, Papua province and West Papua 
province, 1993–2012 (%)
Category/sector Papua	province West	Papua	province
1993 2003 2012 2003 2012
By expenditure category
Private	consumption 53.3 45.3 62.3 66.5 35.7
Government	consumption 10.6 8.9 28.3 14.9 14.6
Fixed	capital	formation 37.5 21.2 39.8 42.7 23.5
Change	in	stocks 3.6 3.7 -3.6 3.4 12.1
Exports	 42.3 71.8 36.7 50.4 47.5
Imports	 47.3 50.9 63.6 78.0 33.3
By sector
Agriculture	 22.3 15.4 12.6 31.9 12.2
Mining	&	quarrying 50.9 61.5 46.5 18.4 6.5
Manufacturing 4.8 2.3 1.9 15.9 54.0
Electricity,	gas	&	water	supply 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.3
Construction 9.3 4.1 13.0 7.0 7.3
Trade,	hotels	&	restaurants 5.7 5.1 6.8 10.0 6.6
Transport	&	communications 3.6 3.9 6.5 6.3 4.7
Finance	&	business 2.4 1.0 3.0 1.5 1.9
Services 0.7 6.5 9.5 8.5 6.6
Source: Provincial	GDP	data	from	BPS.
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Mining and gas
PT Freeport Indonesia has long been the most significant mining opera­
tion in Papua province. It is part of Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold 
Inc., which has its headquarters in Phoenix, Arizona. The company ini­
tially mined copper and gold in the remote and rugged Ertsberg area, 
but since 1988 has concentrated on the Grasberg area, which is about 70 
kilometres from the city of Timika (Ballard and Banks 2009). Since com­
mencing operations in 1967, Freeport has grown into a hugely profitable 
company, mostly due to its exceptionally low production costs and its 
correspondingly high profit margins. In 2010 its annual revenue reached 
$6.7 billion, and in 2011 it paid about $1.9 billion to the Indonesian gov­
ernment in tax. The company directly employed over 24,000 staff in 2011, 
making Freeport one of the largest private sector employers in the whole 
of Indonesia (Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold Inc. 2013).
Freeport has dominated the economy of Papua for many years. For 
much of that time it constituted 50 per cent or more of the provincial 
economy and contributed 90 per cent of Papua’s total exports. Since 
2005, however, Freeport Indonesia’s revenues have been fairly stagnant, 
or declining (Figure 18.3). The main reason for this is the relatively stable 
Figure 18.3 Annual revenue of Freeport-Indonesia, 2005–12
Source: Annual	reports	of	Freeport-McMoRan	Copper	&	Gold,	Inc.
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world copper prices during the period 2005–10, followed by a decline 
since then, without any corresponding significant increase in produc­
tion. The fall in the value of production since 2005 is responsible for the 
decline observed earlier in the value of Papua province’s exports.
The size of the mining industry is such that there is little incentive 
for the provincial government to make serious efforts to develop other 
sectors. Meanwhile, the benefits of this industry for local communities 
are debatable: the company directly employs only 4,000 or so indigenous 
Papuans, and the living conditions of the tribes living in the Grasberg 
area are still very basic. Critics also argue that the higher share of min­
ing revenue flowing to the provincial government since the implementa­
tion of special autonomy has mainly benefited the residents of Jayapura, 
where most of the money has been spent. That is, the combination of a 
limited number of indigenous Papuans absorbed by this industry, the 
urban concentration of government spending and the failure to develop 
other sectors has greatly limited the benefits of the mining industry for 
Papuans in general, and for rural communities in particular.
West Papua province hosts two main types of mining activities. The 
longer­established one is the oil and gas mining in the seas off Sorong 
district and Salawati Island, which began in 1964 (Anggraeni 2007). This 
was important in the development of Sorong city and the surrounding 
areas, although its contribution paled beside that of Freeport. In 2001, for 
example, before Papua was divided into two provinces, oil and gas min­
ing in the Salawati and Sorong areas contributed approximately 4.5 per 
cent of Papua’s GDP and 3 per cent of its exports – far less than Freeport.
The more recent and much more significant activity is LNG extraction 
by BP Indonesia in the Bintuni Bay area. The company launched its Tang­
guh LNG project in 2005, with production commencing in 2009. Since 
then, this single company has dominated the economy of West Papua 
province. By 2012, the Tangguh LNG project accounted for about 42 per 
cent of the province’s GDP and employed around 3,400 people, 54 per 
cent of them Papuan. The company is planning a major expansion of 
operations, so it is expected to remain the main driver of the provincial 
economy for some years to come (TIAP 2012). 
Although BP Indonesia seems to have been able to recruit a higher 
proportion of Papuan employees than Freeport, the benefits of its extrac­
tion activities again appear to be concentrated in urban areas. As in 
Papua province, the large revenues flowing from this single sector can be 
expected to detract from efforts to develop other economic sectors. The 
impact of gas extraction on rural development could be limited unless 
there are concerted efforts to spread the benefits to other sectors, and to 
rural areas.
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18.4 SOCIAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC INDICATORS
Poverty
Although poverty in aggregate has declined in both Papuan provinces 
(see section 18.2), there may still be important differences in poverty lev­
els within each region. In this section we investigate levels of poverty 
in rural and urban areas. This is a very relevant distinction in the case 
of Papua, where the rural and urban economies are very different. In 
particular, government and services are very important in urban areas, 
whereas agriculture dominates the rural economy. The composition of 
the urban and rural populations is also different, with relatively few 
migrants from other parts of Indonesia living in rural areas, and rela­
tively few Papuans living in urban areas.
Figure 18.4 shows the proportion of the rural and urban populations 
living below the poverty line, as defined by BPS, in Papua and West 
Papua provinces. It can be seen that the level of both rural and urban 
poverty declined continuously in the two provinces between 2006 and 
2012. Poverty fell faster in rural than in urban areas, but with no prospect 
of closing the gap. In 2012, urban poverty in both provinces was lower 
than the average for Indonesia’s urban areas of approximately 9 per cent. 
This was far from the case for rural poverty, however, which was much 
Figure 18.4 Share of population below poverty line by urban/rural area, 
Papua province and West Papua province, 2006–12
Source: BPS	(various	years).
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higher than the national average for rural areas of around 15 per cent. 
Around 41 per cent of rural dwellers in Papua province, and 38 per cent 
in West Papua province, were classified as poor in 2012. In short, poverty 
in both provinces is very much a rural phenomenon. 
Programs to develop rural areas and improve the productivity of the 
rural poor have arguably contributed to the observed decline in rural 
poverty in Papua. Yet, the fact that rural poverty remains very high does 
raise questions about the effectiveness of such programs. One of the 
more recent initiatives is the Strategic Village Development Plan (Ren­
cana Strategis Pembangunan Kampung, Respek) introduced in 2007. It 
aims to develop local economies by distributing Rp 100 million (about 
$10,000) to each village in Papua province and West Papua province, 
with the funds to be used to improve nutrition, basic education, primary 
health care, infrastructure and livelihoods. To improve the effectiveness 
of this program, in 2008 Respek was merged with the National Com­
munity Empowerment Program (Program Nasional Pemberdayaan 
Masyarakat, PNPM) (see Chapter 10 by McCarthy et al.). In 2013, it was 
renamed the Strategic Village Economic and Institutional Development 
Program (Program Strategis Pembangunan Ekonomi dan Kelembagaan 
Kampung, Prospek), indicating an additional emphasis on village insti­
tutional development. 
The success of this program is debatable, with both good and bad 
reports. In some villages, it has reportedly induced the development of 
some small­scale, post­harvest agricultural industries. In others, however, 
it appears to have discouraged indigenous farmers from growing staple 
foods and vegetables, thereby possibly reducing the availability of some 
foods in those villages. Apart from any conclusions that may be drawn 
about the program, combating poverty in rural areas is still the main 
development challenge facing the provinces of Papua and West Papua.
Income equality
The Gini coefficient is a measure of income distribution among a popula­
tion, with a rise in the ratio representing an increase in inequality. The 
Gini increased from 0.37 in Papua province and 0.31 in West Papua prov­
ince in 2007 to about 0.42 in both provinces in 2012. This was not very 
different from the ratios for Indonesia as a whole, of 0.33 in 2007 and 0.41 
in 2012. The rise in income inequality in the two provinces, and in Indo­
nesia, was not because the incomes of the poor were not growing – they 
have in fact grown – but rather because the incomes of the rich have been 
growing much faster than those of the poor. 
Figure 18.5 shows average annual growth in household expenditure 
per capita in 2008–12, in real terms, from the poorest percentile of the 
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population (on the left) through to the richest percentile (on the right), 
for both Papua and Indonesia. Expenditure per capita is used as a proxy 
of income, since it is typically difficult to obtain accurate information on 
income in developing countries such as Indonesia. 
It can be seen that, on average, the income of the poorest 1 per cent 
of the population grew by less than 0.5 per cent per year in Papua (and 
less than 2 per cent in Indonesia as a whole), rising to roughly 10 per 
cent annually for the richest 1 per cent of the population, both in Papua 
and nationally. This suggests that the very rich have benefited more 
from development than other segments of the population. Since most 
rich people in Papua live in urban areas, and most of the poor in rural 
areas, it follows that urban dwellers have been the main beneficiaries of 
development. In Papua, a Gini coefficient of 0.42 in 2012 implies average 
household expenditure per capita for the poorest percentile of the popu­
lation of about Rp 120,000 per month, rising to around Rp 5.5 million 
per month for the richest percentile.2 That is, regardless of whether one 
2 Based on data from the first quarter of the 2012 National Socio-Economic Sur­
vey (Survei Sosio­Ekonomi Nasional, Susenas).
Figure 18.5 Distribution of average annual growth in household 
expenditure per capita, Papua and Indonesia, 2008–12
Source: Authors’	calculation	based	on	2008	and	2012	Susenas.
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considers the distribution of income growth or absolute levels of income, 
there is clearly a case for redistributing the benefits of development 
from the richer, mainly urban communities, to poorer rural populations. 
Among the solutions would be a more progressive tax system and social 
programs targeting the poor.
Health
Health outcomes are another commonly used welfare indicator. Here, we 
focus on the incidence of certain diseases. It is important to note, how­
ever, that in Indonesia the incidence of common diseases is generally 
based on reported cases in hospitals and health centres. These numbers 
may not be reliable, since many people who are in need of treatment do 
not attend health clinics or hospitals (Sedyaningsih and Gunawan 2009). 
In regions with poor services, low socio-economic indicators and diffi­
cult terrain, such as the provinces of Papua and West Papua, the numbers 
are almost certainly underestimates. 
Figure 18.6 shows the incidence of three of the most serious diseases 
in Papua province and West Papua province – tuberculosis, malaria and 
AIDS – in comparison with other island groups. In 2010, the two prov­
inces recorded the highest incidence of tuberculosis in the country, of 
227 cases per 100,000 people in Papua province, and 195 in West Papua 
province. Maluku recorded the next highest incidence, with 170 cases per 
100,000 people. The incidence of malaria is also higher in the two Papuan 
provinces than in any other island group – at least three times higher in 
2010 than any other region except Nusa Tenggara. 
Tuberculosis and malaria are among the biggest killers in Papua. 
Rates are persistently high in coastal areas, including urban coastal areas 
(Sedyaningsih and Gunawan 2009). This suggests that the efforts of 
the two provincial governments to target the diseases through various 
health programs have so far not been successful, even in urban areas 
where poverty is not widespread.
AIDS has also become a serious health problem, in Papua province 
in particular. In 2011, the cumulative number of recorded cases was 
approximately 180 per 100,000 people. Not only is this higher than in 
other regions in Indonesia, but it is also a significant increase on the 20 
cases per 100,000 people recorded in 2002. The disease has now spread 
beyond sex workers and drug users into the general community, and 
beyond the mining towns into both urban and rural areas. The causes of 
the disproportionately high number of cases in Papua province can be 
traced to patterns of migration, poor literacy, inadequate education cam­
paigns and a shortage of prevention and treatment programs (Freund 
2007; National AIDS Commission 2009; Sedyaningsih and Gunawan 
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2009). More worrying still is the fact that the rates presented in Figure 
18.6 are most likely substantial underestimates. Especially if they are liv­
ing in rural areas, many Papuans are simply not aware that they may be 
infected and so do not show up at a hospital or health centre. 
Population change and human development
According to the 2010 population census, the combined population of 
the two Papuan provinces is 3.6 million (Table 18.3). The population 
increased by 4.9 per cent annually between 2000 and 2010. This was three 
times the national rate, and higher than during the previous two decades, 
when the population grew by just over 3 per cent annually. Neverthe­
less, population density remains low, at around eight or nine people per 
square kilometre. This is half the density in other resource­rich provinces 
such as East Kalimantan (17 persons per square kilometre), and certainly 
much lower than in Sumatra and Java. 
An influx of non-Papua-born citizens over the past decade or so has 
contributed significantly to Papua’s high and rising population growth 
rates. During 2000–10, the annual growth rate of the non-Papua-born 
population was approximately 4.8 per cent for recent migrants and 6.7 
per cent for lifetime migrants (Table 18.3). These migrants have tended 
Figure 18.6 Incidence of tuberculosis, malaria and AIDS by major island 
group, 2010–11
Source: Ministry	of	Health,	Database	Kesehatan,	http://www.bankdata.depkes.go.id.
Sumatra	 	Java–	 Nusa	 Kali-	 Sulawesi	 Maluku	 West	 Papua
	 Bali	 Tenggara	 mantan	 	 	 Papua
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to settle in urban areas, where they probably account for at least half the 
population (Resosudarmo et al. 2009a).
One main cause of the high growth in the migrant population over 
the past few years has been the sudden increase in demand for skilled 
labour. For example, the activities of BP Indonesia in the Bintuni Bay 
area since 2009 have led to a sharp increase in demand for managerial 
and mining skills. Because of the limited availability of such skills among 
native Papuans, the company has had to recruit from other parts of the 
country, increasing the in­migration rate. BP Indonesia has set a quota 
for its Tangguh LNG project of 85 per cent of jobs to be filled by indig­
enous Papuans by 2029, but in 2012, 46 per cent of its 3,400 workers were 
still non­Papuan (TIAP 2012; BP 2013). Given the slow response from 
the Papuan side to the need for skilled labour, the likely expansion of 
the Tangguh LNG project and the prospect of new oil and gas tenements 
being developed in the future,3 the demand for skilled labour from out­
side Papua is unlikely to abate soon.
As well as being a recipient of skilled migrants, Papua has long been 
viewed as a suitable site for the central government’s transmigration 
3 In December 2009, the Indonesian government offered a new tender for 24 oil 
and gas blocks, including one in West Berau (near BP Indonesia’s current site 
of operation) and five in Cenderawasih Bay; see ‘Indonesia opens 24 new oil 
and gas blocks for tender and direct offer’, energy-pedia news, 1 December 2009.
Table 18.3 Population dynamics in Papua, 1980–2010a
Growth	rate	(%	p.a.) Share	of	
total,	2010 
(%)
Population 
(thousand)
1980–90 1990–2000 2000–10
Total 3.5 3.0 4.9 100.0 3,594
Lifetime	migrant 10.6 3.1 6.7 19.1 686
Recent	migrant 8.2 0.2 4.8 3.4 120
Non-migrant 2.3 3.1 4.5 77.6 2,787
Urban 5.1 5.5 4.6 26.1 937
Rural 3.5 2.3 5.0 73.9 2,657
a	 Lifetime	migrants	are	those	who	currently	live	in	a	province	that	is	different	from	the	prov-
ince	of	birth.	Recent	migrants	are	migrants	aged	five	years	or	over	who	reside	in	a	different	
province	from	their	province	of	residence	five	years	previously.	For	purposes	of	compari-
son,	people	who	were	born	in	West	Papua	but	now	live	in	Papua	province,	and	vice	versa,	
are	categorized	as	non-migrants.
Source: Authors’	calaculation	based	on	1980,	1990,	2000	and	2010	population	censuses.
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program because of its low population density. The Ministry of Trans­
migration says it has identified 5.87 million hectares of land in Papua 
suitable for transmigration settlements. It aims to move around 10,000 
people from West Java and East Java annually to other places in Indo­
nesia, including Papua, where some previous sites have developed into 
thriving horticultural supply centres. In 2010, the governors of West Java 
and West Papua signed an agreement that would see 700 West Javanese 
farming households migrate annually to West Papua.4
Migrants entering Papua under government transmigration schemes 
and to meet the demand for skilled workers do not provide the entire 
explanation for the increase in the overall number of migrants in Papua 
over the last 10 years or so. Of course, in addition to skilled workers and 
transmigrants, many people come to Papua to work in service sectors 
such as transport and trade, hotels and restaurants, or to set up small 
businesses. Data from the 2010 population census suggest that, like skilled 
migrants and transmigrants, most of them have settled in urban areas.
Although the Papua­born population grew more slowly than the 
migrant population – by 4.5 per cent in 2000–10, compared with 6.7 per 
cent for lifetime migrants and 4.8 per cent for recent migrants (Table 
18.3) – non­migrants still form the majority of the population (78 per 
cent in 2010). The rural population has been growing faster than the 
urban population: by 5.0 per cent per annum over the period 2000–10, 
compared with 4.6 per cent for the urban population. This could reflect 
improvements in health care in rural areas, but it is still a surprisingly 
high growth rate for Papua’s slower­growing rural economy.
Overall, migrants are better educated than the average Papua­born 
citizen (Figure 18.7). The educational attainment of recent migrants is 
similar to that of lifetime migrants, with the majority having at least a 
junior secondary education. Most non­migrants, on the other hand, have 
gone no further than primary or junior secondary school. Among the 
non­migrants, West Papuans are better educated than Papuans: more 
than 50 per cent of Papuans, but only 20 per cent of West Papuans, have 
just a primary education.
Given the persistent shortage of specific skills in the mining and oil 
and gas sectors, and the expectation that more projects will come on 
stream in the future, the need for well­educated workers will only grow 
in the short to medium terms. For Papua-born citizens to play a bigger 
part in fulfilling this demand, local governments will need to invest 
more in education, especially tertiary education. This should be accom­
panied by strategies to ensure that knowledge and skills are transferred 
4 ‘5 juta ha lahan transmigrasi di Papua Barat’ [5 million hectares of trans­
migration areas in West Papua], Viva News, 10 February 2010.
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from migrants to non­migrants, in order to improve the social returns to 
education.
Because most migrants are better educated than non­migrants, they 
tend to have higher incomes than the average Papuan. They and the 
richer Papuans generally live in urban areas. It is therefore not surprising 
that the urban population has so far benefited disproportionately from 
development in the two provinces.
18.5 REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT
In this section, we try to identify the areas within the provinces of Papua 
and West Papua that have benefited most from development since the 
Figure 18.7 Educational attainment among migrants and non-migrants, 
Papua province and West Papua province, 2010
a	 Lifetime	migrants	are	those	who	currently	live	in	a	province	that	is	different	from	the	prov-
ince	of	birth.	Recent	migrants	are	migrants	aged	five	years	or	over	who	reside	in	a	different	
province	from	their	province	of	residence	five	years	previously.	For	purposes	of	compari-
son,	people	who	were	born	in	West	Papua	but	now	live	in	Papua	province,	and	vice	versa,	
are	categorized	as	non-migrants.
Source: Authors’	calculation	based	on	2010	population	census.
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split in 2003. Table 18.4 shows regional GDP in the greater Sorong area 
(consisting of Sorong district and Sorong city), Manokwari district, Teluk 
Bintuni district and ‘other’ districts (within West Papua province); and in 
the greater Jayapura area (consisting of Jayapura district and Jayapura 
city), Mimika district, Merauke district and ‘other’ districts (within 
Papua province). 
In West Papua province, the greater Sorong area and Teluk Bintuni 
district are both resource­based, development­driven regions. Oil and 
gas activities have driven development in Sorong, and the activities of 
Tangguh LNG in Teluk Bintuni. Growth in Manokwari district, on the 
other hand, has been heavily reliant on government spending. The cap­
ital cities of the districts of Sorong and Manokwari – Sorong city and 
Manokwari city – are relatively large municipalities that act as growth 
centres for the surrounding regions. 
From Table 18.4 it can be seen that Teluk Bintuni’s GDP has grown so 
rapidly that its income per capita was around 10 times that of the other 
regions in 2011. The greater Sorong area registered the slowest growth 
of both GDP and GDP per capita in 2003–11, due to the slower rate of 
Table 18.4 GDP and private expenditure by district, Papua province and 
West Papua province, 2003–11
District/group	 
of	districts
Growth	 
of	GDP,	 
2003–11 
(%	p.a.)
Growth	of	
GDP	per	
capita,	 
2003–11 
(%	p.a.)
GDP	 
per	capita,	 
2011 
(Rp	thousand)
Private	
expenditure	
per	capita,	
2011 
(Rp	thousand)
West Papua province
Greater	Sorong	areaa 4.6 2.0 36,209 8,450
Manokwari	district 8.7 5.3 18,049 8,128
Teluk	Bintuni	district 39.5 33.6 298,731 11,555
Other	districts 8.7 5.2 22,880 6,634
Papua province
Greater	Jayapura	areaa 12.0 8.3 31,050 9,960
Mimika	district –7.1 –12.0 239,083 10,354
Merauke	district 6.9 4.8 21,234 7,135
Other	districts 5.8 -4.5 7,035 5,315
a	 The	greater	Sorong	area	consists	of	Sorong	district	and	Sorong	municipality;	 the	greater	
Jayapura	area	consists	of	Jayapura	district	and	Jayapura	municipality.
Source: Authors’	calculation	based	on	regional	GDP	data	from	BPS.
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expansion of oil and gas projects. Income per capita in Manokwari and 
the ‘other’ districts grew at about the same rate (just over 5 per cent) and 
their levels of per capita income in 2011 were broadly similar. Hence, if 
one excludes Teluk Bintuni, it appears that development has been rela­
tively equally distributed across the province. 
In Papua province, growth in the greater Jayapura area, including the 
capital city of Jayapura, has been driven by government spending, and 
that of Mimika by its resources. In Merauke, the relatively large capital 
city of Merauke once again acts as a growth centre for the surrounding 
district.
Both GDP and GDP per capita in Mimika district have contracted 
over the last few years as Freeport Indonesia’s revenue and exports 
have slowed. Nevertheless, it remains a relatively rich region in terms 
of income per capita. The region with the fastest growth has been the 
greater Jayapura area, where GDP grew by 12 per cent per annum in 
2003–11, and GDP per capita by 8 per cent, making it the second-richest 
region in Papua province after Mimika. GDP in Merauke and the ‘other’ 
districts grew at around half the rate of the greater Jayapura area. GDP 
per capita in the ‘other’ districts actually contracted between 2003 and 
2011, with the result that they recorded the lowest income per capita in 
2011. One can conclude that the greater Jayapura area has so far captured 
most of the benefits of development in Papua province.
Government expenditure
Government expenditure, by both the central government and local 
governments, is an important sector in the two Papuan provinces. As 
revealed in the regional accounts, it has been growing quite quickly – 
by over 10 per cent annually during the past decade or so. Government 
expenditure makes an important contribution to the economies of the two 
provinces, and creates significant multiplier effects in other sectors. For 
example, government spending on roads and transport not only directly 
expands the construction and transport sectors, but also induces expan­
sion in other sectors such as trade, agriculture and manufacturing. This 
section discusses the size and types of local government expenditure, for 
both the provincial and district governments. It does not examine central 
government expenditures in the two Papuan provinces, which are more 
difficult to dissect.
Local governments in Papua derive most of their income from the 
DAU, from the special autonomy funds (dana otsus) available only to 
Papua and Aceh, and from their own natural resources (the latter through 
revenue sharing with the central government; see section 18.1 above). In 
2011, these three sources of income accounted for about 46 per cent, 25 
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per cent and 9 per cent respectively of total income in Papua province, 
and 34 per cent, 29 per cent and 21 per cent in West Papua province. By 
comparison, the shares of total income for all Indonesian provinces were 
44 per cent (DAU) and 17 per cent (revenue sharing). Transfers from the 
Special Purpose Fund (Dana Alokasi Khusus, DAK) were more impor­
tant for Papua province (7 per cent of total local government income) 
than for West Papua province (5 per cent). Own­source revenue (pen-
dapatan asli daerah, PAD) has been relatively unimportant in both prov­
inces, constituting just 3 per cent of total local government income in 
both provinces in 2011. Both provinces have put most of their income to 
use: Papua province was able to spend approximately 88 per cent of its 
income in 2011, and West Papua province 93 per cent. 
Although small compared with those of middle­income and devel­
oped countries,5 the per capita expenditures of the Papua and West 
Papua provincial governments are relatively large compared with those 
of other Indonesian provinces and some other developing countries. 
Figure 18.8 shows that, in both 2007 and 2011, realized per capita gov­
ernment expenditures in the two provinces were at least twice those in 
the other major island groups. In 2011, government expenditure was just 
5 See http://www.principalglobalindicators.org/default.aspx.
Figure 18.8 Local government expenditure per capita by major island 
group, 2007 and 2011
Source: Authors’	calculation	based	on	data	from	Directorate	General	for	Fiscal	Balance	(2013).
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Table 18.5 Structure of government expenditures in Papua province and 
West Papua province, 2010 (%)
Category West	Papua	
province
Papua	 
province
National	
average
General	services 53.5 49.1 32.5
Order	&	security 1.2 0.7 0.9
Economic 9.5 10.6 8.9
Environment 0.5 0.5 1.7
Housing	&	public	facilities 17.4 16.1 14.5
Health 5.0 8.4 9.8
Tourism	&	culture 0.6 0.6 0.6
Education 10.1 12.5 29.7
Social	protection 2.2 1.6 1.3
Source: Authors’	calculation	based	on	data	from	Directorate	General	for	Fiscal	Balance	(2013).
over Rp 8 million per capita in Papua province, and more than Rp 12 mil­
lion in West Papua province. 
The main problem in Papua is not so much the amount of government 
expenditures but how the money is allocated. The largest expenditure 
item in the provincial budgets is general administration (employees’ sal­
aries, building maintenance and other items related to local government 
facilities), most of which is spent in urban areas (Table 18.5). In 2010, the 
national average for local government expenditure on general adminis­
tration as a share of total expenditure was a rather high 33 per cent (see 
Lewis, Chapter 6), but in Papua province and West Papua province the 
shares were far higher, at 54 per cent and 49 per cent respectively. The 
consequence of this high spending on general administration is that not 
much is left over to fund other priorities. For example, although required 
by Law 20/2003 on the National Education System to spend at least 20 
per cent of their budgets on education (Suryadarma and Jones 2013), in 
2010 Papua province and West Papua province spent only 10 per cent 
and 13 per cent respectively on this sector. Spending on much needed 
social protection measures was lower still, at around 2 per cent of total 
expenditures in both provinces.
Clearly the structure of local government expenditures in both prov­
inces needs to change so that far less is spent on general administration 
and far more on the economic, health, tourism, education and social pro­
tection sectors.
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Infrastructure
Although development in Papua has mainly benefited urban areas, most 
Papuans – including the vast majority of indigenous Papuans – are still 
dependent on the rural economy. Close to 74 per cent of the population 
lives in rural areas, with limited access to education and health services, 
electricity and other economic infrastructure. Improving conditions in 
rural areas is therefore essential to provide greater equality in education 
and welfare to Papua­born citizens – surely the main purpose of Papuan 
development.
One of the chief requirements is to improve rural infrastructure and 
facilities, with education, energy, trade and transport infrastructure all 
requiring attention. For example, the poor quality of educational facili­
ties is certainly a factor in the current low levels of educational attain­
ment among Papuans; and deficiencies in energy supply have been a 
major bottleneck for the development of various sectors, including trade, 
education and industry. 
To provide an indication of the severity of the situation, Figure 18.9 
shows electricity consumption per capita in Papua compared with that 
in the other major island groups. Electricity consumption by Papuan 
Figure 18.9 Electricity consumption per capita by major island group 
(kWh per capita)
Source: BPS	(various	years).
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households in both 2004 and 2010 was lower than anywhere else in Indo­
nesia; in fact, the per capita consumption of Papua in 2010 was similar to 
that of Bali and Nusa Tenggara six years earlier, in 2004. The shortage of 
electricity is especially acute in Papua’s rural areas.
Although Papua’s low population density and difficult terrain con­
strain the ability of governments to finance electrification and provide 
other essential infrastructure in rural areas, solving this problem needs 
to be a high priority in policy debate and practice.
18.6 FINAL REMARKS
In this chapter, we have examined various aspects of development in 
the two Papuan provinces. In general, using GDP and poverty levels as 
indicators of development, it appears that the region as a whole has been 
developing at a faster rate than the national average. Although GDP in 
the post­2003 province of Papua has been stagnant, economic activities 
other than mining have grown significantly. We therefore reject the argu­
ment that development has been stagnant. On the contrary, we argue that 
Papua has been one of the most dynamic regions in the country. Never­
theless, both Papuan provinces face serious development challenges.
The main one is to reduce rural poverty, which is still very high – about 
41 per cent in 2012, or more than double the national average. Urban 
poverty, on the other hand, is roughly the same as in the country as a 
whole. Moreover, annual growth in household income has been much 
lower in rural than in urban areas, resulting in slower than expected pov­
erty reduction in rural areas.
We have offered several explanations for the failure of rural poverty 
to decline as quickly as it should have. First, the economies of both prov­
inces are heavily reliant on extractive industries, with the result that fewer 
government resources are directed to other sectors that could generate 
broader benefits, such as agriculture. Second, rural areas lack education, 
health and other infrastructure, resulting in low levels of educational 
attainment and employment generation. Third, most government spend­
ing has been on government administration, at the expense of programs 
to alleviate rural poverty. The existing poverty alleviation programs are 
neither adequately funded nor effective. Fourth, there has been a strong 
urban bias to development. Most of the government budget (including 
the salaries of government employees) has been spent either in urban 
areas or in the mining enclaves; these areas are also the beneficiaries of 
spending by private sector workers employed by extractive and other 
industries. This has made these areas attractive to migrants, many of 
whom have set up businesses servicing the surrounding communities. 
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This in turn has led to further increases in government budgetary spend­
ing in urban areas. Finally, rural population growth has been relatively 
high, so the benefits of economic growth in rural areas have had to be 
distributed among a larger population.
In addition to the factors mentioned above, governance and politi­
cal issues are widely believed to exacerbate rural poverty in Papua. For 
example, a lack of transparency in the management of public finance has 
given bureaucrats opportunities to act corruptly. Traditional customary 
law on land and forest rights is another factor, as it commonly creates 
conflict between local communities and the government or investors, 
slowing down development. The process of subdivision of districts into 
ever­smaller administrative units (pemekaran) has also created conflict 
between competing elites over the spoils of government, thus inducing 
uncertainty and delaying the implementation of various poverty allevia­
tion programs (see Nolan, Jones and Solahudin, Chapter 17).
There is also much to be done to improve other welfare indicators, 
such as public health outcomes. The incidence of tuberculosis, malaria 
and AIDS, for instance, is much higher in Papua than in other regions. 
One of the most convincing explanations for the poor health outcomes 
in Papua is the inadequate government health budgets and the failure to 
spend funds wisely.
Finally, we have argued that the dependence of both provinces’ econ­
omies on just a few extractive sectors creates problems. First, the benefits 
of mining, oil and gas activities have not spread to the general popu­
lation, particularly in rural areas. Second, the dominance of extractive 
industries means that there is less incentive to develop other sectors. But 
as a consequence, when there is a contraction in the extractive industries, 
the whole economy contracts as well.
Future policies in Papua province and West Papua province should 
focus on encouraging the development of sectors that would benefit the 
rural population, such as agriculture and agricultural processing. Larger 
and better­targeted programs to promote the development of rural infra­
structure, education, and trade in goods and services between rural and 
urban areas should also be established. Finally, to the extent that the 
rapid growth of the rural population is due to high fertility rates, it may 
be advisable to re­establish a strong family planning program. 
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